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We examine how the level deposit insurance coverage affects bank liquidity. We also test the role
of ownership in the relationship between deposit insurance coverage and bank liquidity. This study
uses quarterly data of Indonesian banks from Q1:2002 - Q2:2008. We argue that the presence of explicit deposit insurance changes a bank‘s behavior in liquidity management in the form of decreasing
asset liquidity. We find some evidence on the negative impact of deposit insurance coverage on bank
liquidity. However, little is found on the role of ownership structure. The credibility of deposit insurance system and implicit guarantee are the main policy implications.
Keywords: Deposit Insurance; Insurance Coverage; Bank Liquidity; Ownership; Indonesia
JEL classification: G21; G28

Introduction
As financial intermediary institutions, banks
encounter maturity mismatch problem, receiving deposit in the short term but providing longterm credit. Thus a liquidity shock triggered
by a number of deposits withdrawal and loan
commitments drawdown can lead to a bank run,
where depositors rush to withdraw their deposits because they expect the bank to fail (Diamond & Dybvig, 1983). It is therefore imperative for banks to properly manage their liquidity
position, that is, to meet obligations when they
come due without incurring unacceptable losses. There must be a balance between short-term
assets and short-term liabilities and proper
management of the liquidity of asset portfolios

in response to depositors' behavior (Franck &
Krausz, 2007; Sawada, 2010).
In this study, we argue that the presence of
explicit deposit insurance changes a bank‘s
behavior in liquidity management in the form
of decreasing asset liquidity. We present three
related reasons behind the argument. First, it
is generally known that the initial objective of
an adoption of banking deposit insurance is to
minimize the likelihood of bank runs (Diamond
& Dybvig, 1983; Pennachi, 2006). We thus argue that banks reduce their costly attention in
the balancing of their liquidity. It is supported
by our second reason; several studies have previously found that deposit insurance provides
positive benefit for the banking system in improving financial intermediation, achieved

* Corresponding Email: irwan.trinugroho@gmail.com
1
The views expressed in this paper are the authors' only and do not necessarily reflect those of the Indonesia Deposit
Insurance Corporation
59
Published by UI Scholars Hub, 2016

1

The Indonesian Capital Market Review, Vol. 8, No. 2 [2016], Art. 1
I. Trinugroho, M. Muthmainah, M. D. Ariefianto, S. Sutaryo, and A. N. Probohudono
Indonesian Capital Market Review 8 (2016) 59-71

through increased deposit-taking and confidence of bank depositors (Chernykh & Cole,
2011; Diamond & Dybvig, 1983). Third, we use
the risk-taking hypothesis to explain the impact
of explicit deposit insurance on decreasing bank
liquidity. Deposit insurance leads to excessive
risk-taking by creating an incentive for banks
to shift the risk to guarantors of their creditors
(Angkinand & Wilhborg, 2010). Chernykh and
Cole (2011) find evidence of moral hazard in
deposit insurance adoption in the form of increased risk-taking, as measured by financial
risk (ratio of equity to total assets) and operating risk (ratio of loans to total assets). We thus
argue that the increase of loans as a risk-taking
behavior would reduce bank liquidity.
The second objective of this study is to test
the role of ownership2 in the relationship between deposit insurance coverage and bank
liquidity by examining the two opposing arguments. First, we attempt to address the different
effects of the presence of explicit deposit insurance in state-owned banks. There are two main
theories related to state-owned banks. In social
or development theory, state-owned banks are
found to be less profitable because their main
objective is to drive the development of a country. As such, they often finance unprofitable
investments. Whereas the political theory of
government ownership of banks explains that
state-owned banks are less profitable because
they serve the interests of politicians (La Porta,
López-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 2002), thus influencing the bank behavior in the form of lending behavior (Dinc, 2005; Micco, Panizza, &
Yanez, 2007). Both theories imply that stateowned banks provide more loans either in view
of the development purposes or to serve political motives. Thus, with or without the presence
of deposit insurance, state-owned banks incur
high proportion of loans in their assets and low
proportion of liquid assets. Therefore, the effect

of deposit insurance on bank liquidity should be
lower in state-owned banks than in other banks.
Second, we examine the effect of deposit insurance on bank liquidity in foreign banks. Foreign banks have more diversified sources of liquidity (Freixas & Holthausen, 2005) and have
reduced risk of aggregate liquidity shortages in
emerging economies (Dinger, 2009). Because
of their broad sources of funding, efficient liquidity management and excellent reputation,
the presence of deposit insurance regulation
would not dramatically change the behavior of
foreign banks. Therefore, the effect of deposit
insurance on bank liquidity should be lower in
foreign banks than in other banks.
Indonesian banks are found to be suitable
objects for this study as they have experienced a
number of different levels of deposit insurance
coverage set by the government. The existence
of formal deposit insurance scheme in Indonesia was confirmed by Act No. 24 of 2004 concerning the Deposit Insurance Agency (LPS)3,
an agency which is assigned to perform banking deposit insurance (Hadad, Agusman, Monroe, Gasbarro, & Zumwalt, 2011; Nys, Tarazi,
& Trinugroho, 2015)4. Initially, the maximum
insured deposits were all deposits (blanket
guarantee), then successively reduced to 5 billion Rupiah and 1 billion Rupiah. Beginning
March 2007, deposits were guaranteed a maximum savings of 100 million Rupiah. Because
of the financial crisis in 2008, maximum guaranteed deposits were raised to 2 billion Rupiah
(Annual report of Indonesian Deposit Insurance
Agency, 2009).
This paper contributes to the literature in the
following ways. First, according the nature of
the data, we use five dummy variables to represent each period of the changes of deposit
insurance coverage. The most used measure
of deposit insurance in previous studies is the
dummy variable, the value of which is 1 for

2
We define the bank ownership based on the type of ownership. In Indonesian banking, Commercial banks, based on
type of ownership, are classified into five categories, those are regional development banks, state-owned banks, foreign
banks, joint venture banks and private domestic banks. However, in this study we divide into three categories state-owned
banks (including regional development banks), foreign banks (including joint venture banks) and private domestic banks
3
Before that, the Indonesian government applied the blanket guarantee scheme (BGS) for only domestic banks (Hadad et
al., 2011; Nys et al., 2015) since January 1998.
4
In the Act, it is explained that the functions of Deposit Insurance Agency (LPS) are to guarantee deposits and to actively
participate in maintaining the stability of the banking system in accordance with its authority.
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bank insuring deposits and 0 otherwise. Second,
by using a bank’s financial statement quarterly
data, we can capture the more rigorous effect of
the level of deposit insurance coverage on bank
liquidity than by using annual data. Third, we
employ difference-in-difference model to test
the difference effect of deposit insurance coverage on bank liquidity between state-owned
banks and non-state-owned banks and between
foreign banks and non-foreign banks.

Literature Review
Our literature review commenced with the
causes, definition and data of bank liquidity. Banks collect funds from surplus spending
units with a certain cost and distribute it to deficit spending units by imposing a certain interest
rate as the banks’ earning. Other than deposit
interest cost, banks also face contemporaneous
transaction costs on both its assets’ and its liabilities’ side. Imposing these costs will lead to
an interdependent relationship between assets
and liabilities, which meant a change in assets
will lead to a change in liabilities and vice versa
(Elyasiani, Kopecky, & Hoose 1995). Liquidity
refers to the ability to meet obligations when
they are due without incurring unacceptable
losses. The decline in the amount of deposit
will cause banks to raise liquid asset, since
higher liquidity of assets allows banks to liquidate more easily in a crisis. Ennis and Keister (2006) points out that a bank will choose to
hold an amount of liquid reserves exactly equal
to the withdrawal demand if a run does not occur. Kasyap, Rajan, and Stein (2002)5 conclude
that there is a positive correlation between
transaction deposits6 (as measured by the ratio
of transaction deposit to total deposit) and (liquid assets proxied by ratio of cash plus securities to total assets and ratio of securities to total assets). Wagner (2006) explains that higher
asset liquidity directly benefits stability by encouraging banks to reduce the risks on their bal-

ance sheets and by facilitating the liquidation
of assets in a crisis. Sawada (2010) finds that
in banking systems without deposit insurance,
banks react to the liquidity shock sensitively
through an increase in their cash holdings. The
cash holdings are increased not by liquidating
bank loans but by selling securities in the financial market.
As explained above, banks are required to
maintain sufficient funding and liquid assets
to accommodate such changes and funding
demands as they occur from time to time. We
argue that the presence of explicit deposit insurance will change a bank’s behavior in liquidity
management. The benefits of adopting explicit
deposit insurance have been illustrated in literature. On one hand, explicit deposit insurance
reduces the likelihood of bank runs as long as
the guarantees remain credible. Diamond and
Dybvig (1983) argue that deposit insurance
enhances the stability of the financial system
by reducing the risk of bank runs, raising the
confidence of depositors. Pennachi (2006) explains that a bank can hedge liquidity shocks
using deposit insurance. Chernykh and Cole
(2011) find that the longer a bank has entered
into a deposit insurance system, the greater is
the deposit and ratio of deposit to assets. Thus,
many studies show that deposit insurance improves the financial intermediation of banks.
On the other hand, several studies provide evidence of negative impact of deposit insurance.
Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1997) find a
pronounced positive partial correlation between
explicit deposit insurance and systemic banking
insolvencies. Demirguç-Kunt and Detragiache
(2002) and Barth et al. (2004) ﬁnd that explicit
deposit insurance increases moral hazard incentives and results in increasing ﬁnancial fragility,
thus increasing the likelihood of banking crises.
Chernykh and Cole (2011) conclude that the
implementation of deposit insurance increases
the bank’s risk-taking behaviour, as reflected
by increased financial risk (ratio of equity to

They propose a simple and convincing risk-management rationale for a defining characteristic of a commercial bank,
namely a financial intermediary that combines demand deposits with loan commitments and lines of credit, they build the
theoretical framework in the relationship between two traditional activities of deposit-taking and lending. They conclude
that there will be synergies between these two activities that require banks to hold large balances of liquid assets.
6
Transaction deposits could sometimes expose banks to liquidity risk when consumers withdraw deposits, for their own
consumption or because they have lost conﬁdence in the banking system.
5
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total assets) and increased operating risk (ratio
of loans to total assets). Related to bank liquidity, both the mentioned benefits and costs of the
adoption of deposit insurance support our argument that deposit insurance leads to decreasing
liquid assets and increasing loans.
The role of state-owned banks or government banks in a banking system has been studied in several perspectives: in particular, stateowned banks in emerging countries (Micco
et al., 2007). State-owned banks in emerging
countries tend to be less profitable and more
costly than private banks. According to social
or development theories, state-owned banks
are often inefficient because they play a role as
an agent of development. Sometimes they are
assigned to fund unprofitable government or
state-owned enterprises’ projects. The political
theory of government ownership of banks explains that state-owned banks are less profitable
because they have to serve the interest of politicians (La Porta et al., 2002). They tend to have
a weak supervisory function and face quite
complicated agency problems, thus influencing
bank behavior in the form of lending behavior
(Dinc, 2005; Micco & Panizza, 2006; Micco et
al., 2007; Sapienza, 2004).
Related to the deposit insurance system in
place and liquidity, it could be argued that the
effect of deposit insurance on liquidity should
be lower for state-owned banks for several reasons. First, those banks, especially in the context of Indonesia, are benefitted by its status as
they are perceived as less risky by depositors
(Nys et al., 2015). Therefore, they have a larger
financing source mostly from depositors. Second, both theories explained earlier advance
the proposition that state-owned banks provide
more loans because they either strive for a development purpose or serve a political motive.
Thus, regardless the deposit insurance system
in place, state-owned banks incur high proportion of loans in their assets and low proportion
of liquid assets.
It is generally accepted that foreign banks in
emerging countries have positive economic impacts on the host country in terms of resources
allocation and higher efficiency (Claessens,
Kunt, & Huizinga, 2001; Trinugroho, Agus-
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man, & Tarazi, 2014). Freixas and Holthausen
(2005) find that transnational banks have more
diversified sources of liquidity. Dinger (2009)
finds that transnational banks’ presence significantly reduces the risk of aggregate liquidity
shortages in emerging economies. Therefore,
because of their broad sources of funding, efficient liquidity management and excellent reputation, the presence of deposit insurance system
would not dramatically change the behavior of
foreign banks.

Research Methods
Based on the background and literature review, we formulate the following three hypotheses of this research:
H1 : The level of deposit insurance coverage
negatively affects bank liquidity
H2a : The effect of the level of deposit insurance coverage on bank liquidity is lower
in state-owned banks than in other banks
H2b : The effect of the level of deposit insurance coverage on bank liquidity is lower
in foreign banks than in other banks
As written in the literature review, the LPS
guarantee deposits for all conventional and Islamic banks operating in Indonesia. The conventional banks covered include both commercial banks (regional development banks,
state-owned banks, foreign-owned banks, jointventure banks and domestic-private banks) and
rural banks. However, in this study, we exclude
Islamic banks and rural banks from our sample because of different intermediation method
used by Islamic banking and different characteristics of rural banks. The data on the number
of Indonesian banks based on the type of ownership can be seen in Table 1.
To test these hypotheses, we employ quarterly data from Q1:2002 – Q2:2008 from 109
commercial banks operating during this period.
After making adjustment to the data set (i.e.
cleansing and filtering), we run our model with
2,726 eligible observations making it an unbalanced panel data set.
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Table 1. Number of sample based on type of ownership
Type of Ownership
State-Owned Banks (including Regional Development Banks)
Foreign Banks (including Joint Venture Banks)
Private Domestic Banks
Sample

Model

Number of Banks
30
25
54
109

While, to test the specific effect of the level
of deposit insurance coverage on the liquidity
of state-owned banks and in foreign banks, we
use the difference in difference estimator.

D1 is the period when there was no formal deposit insurance (Q1:2002 – Q3:2005). However, in this period, the Indonesian government
applied the blanket guarantee scheme (BGS)
for domestic banks (Hadad et al., 2011; Nys
et al., 2015), 2) D2 is the period when the all
deposits are insured (Q4:2005 – Q1:2006), D3
is the period when the maximum deposit insurance coverage was 5 Billion Rupiah (Q2:2006 –
Q3:2006), D4 is the period when the maximum
deposit insurance coverage was 1 Billion Rupiah (Q4:2006 – Q1:2007), and D5 is the period when maximum deposit insurance coverage
was 100 Million Rupiah (Q2:2007 – Q2:2008).

Bank Liquidity

Bank Ownership

To measure bank liquidity (LIQ), we use several proxies. (1) Liquid assets (LATA), is the ratio of liquid asset to total asset, (2) Ratio of liquid asset to deposits (LADEP). We modify the
proxy used by Dinger (2009), the ratio of liquid
assets to customer and short term funding. The
numerators of the variable include: cash, placement with Bank Indonesia, government bonds
and net interbank market. The denominator is
total assets. It is based on the composition of
asset in balance sheet of Indonesian banks. The
others proxy of bank liquidity, we employ the
variables used by Sawada (2010) as follows: (3)
Ratio of cash to total assets (CTA), (4) Ratio of
loans to total assets (LTA). We expect that the
level of insured deposits negatively affect the
ratio of liquid asset to total assets, ratio of liquid
assets to deposits and the ratio of cash to total
assets, but positively influence the ratio of loans
to total assets.

In this study, based on ownership type, banks
are divided into three categories. State-owned
Banks (SOB) are banks owned fully or owned
in a majority proportion by central government
or regional (province) government. Foreign
Banks (FOB) are private commercial banks
which are representative (branch office) of parent banks in their home country or commercial
banks that were established jointly by one or
more commercial banks based in Indonesia and
was established by citizens and/or Indonesian
legal entity wholly owned by Indonesian citizens, with one or more bank domiciled abroad.
Private Domestic Banks (PDB) are domestic
banks owned fully or owned in a majority proportion by private or non-government institutions.

To test the effect of the level of deposit insurance coverage on bank liquidity, we use the
following equation:
LIQi,t = α0 + α1D1i,t + α1D2i,t + α1D3i,t + α1D4i,t
		 + α1D5i,t + α2LISTEDi,t + α3TAi,t
		 + α4EQTAi,t + εi,t
(1)

Deposit Insurance
To measure the deposit insurance coverage,
we use dummy variable for each period of the
different deposit insurance schemes as follows:

Control Variables
We include bank size and capitalization as
bank controls. A bank’s size can be an important determinant of liquidity position because it
affects both the costs and availability of liquidity. It could be argued that a bank’s capitalization level is expected to have an impact on its

63
Published by UI Scholars Hub, 2016

5

The Indonesian Capital Market Review, Vol. 8, No. 2 [2016], Art. 1
I. Trinugroho, M. Muthmainah, M. D. Ariefianto, S. Sutaryo, and A. N. Probohudono
Indonesian Capital Market Review 8 (2016) 59-71

Table 2. Descriptive Statistics for the Variables (Full Sample)
This table presents the descriptive statistics for the variables of all observations. LATA is the ratio of liquid assets (cash, placements in
central bank, government bonds, and net interbank deposits) to total assets. LADEP is the ratio of liquid assets to deposits. CTA is ratio
cash to total assets. LTA is a ratio of loans to total assets. LISTED is dummy variable the value of 1 is banks listed in stock exchange and 0
otherwise. LnTA is log natural of total assets. EQTA is ratio of equity to total assets.
Variables
Mean
0.41
0.6
0.02
0.51
0.14
14.58
0.14
2726

Ratio of Liquid Assets to Total Assets (LATA)
Ratio of Liquid Assets to Deposits (LADEP)
Ratio of Cash to Total Assets (CTA)
Ratio of Loans to Total Assets (LTA)
Listed Banks (LISTED)
Ln Total Assets (LnTA)
Equity to Total Assets (EQTA)
Number of Observation

Md
0.38
0.53
0.01
0.52
0
14.48
0.11
2726

Statistics (Full Sample)
Min
0.05
0.03
0.00004
0.004
0
9.39
0.0001
2726

Max
0.99
8.95
0.14
0.95
1
19.53
0.94
2726

St.Dev
0.2
0.44
0.02
0.19
0.34
1.86
0.1
2726

Table 3. Descriptive Statistics for Variables Based on Type of Ownership
This table presents the descriptive statistics for variables based on type of ownership. LATA is ratio of liquid assets (cash, placements in
central bank, government bonds, and net interbank deposits) to total assets. LADEP is ratio of liquid assets to deposits. CTA is ratio cash to
total assets. LTA is ratio of loans to total assets. DEPINS is percentage of insured deposits to total deposits. LISTED is dummy variable the
value of 1 is banks listed in stock exchange and 0 otherwise. LnTA is log natural of total assets. EQTA is ratio of equity to total assets.
State-owned Banks
Foreign Banks
Private Domestic Banks
Mean Md Min Max St.Dev Mean Md Min Max St.Dev Mean Md Min Max St.Dev

Variables

Ratio of Liquid Assets to Total Assets (LATA) 0.52 0.52 0.15 0.85
Ratio of Liquid Assets to Deposits (LADEP)
0.69 0.65 0.22 3.42
Ratio of Cash to Total Assets (CTA)
0.05 0.04 0.002 0.14
Ratio of Loans to Total Assets (LTA)
0.43 0.42 0.13 0.82
Listed Banks (LISTED)
0.08 0
0
1
Ln Total Assets (LnTA)
15.24 14.94 11.98 19.53
Equity to Total Assets (EQTA)
0.11 0.09 0.03 0.34
Number of Observation
754 754 754 754

0.14 0.4 0.37 0.05 0.99
0.31 0.76 0.6
0.09 5.34
0.03 0.004 0.002 0.00004 0.02
0.14 0.53 0.53 0.004 0.95
0.28
0
0
0
0
1.64 15.05 15.01 12.34 17.66
0.05 0.17 0.17 0.0001 0.75
754 621 621
621
621

0.21
0.54
0.004
0.22
0
1.24
0.12
621

0.35 0.3 0.05 0.99
0.47 0.37 0.03 8.95
0.01 0.01 0.0003 0.06
0.56 0.6 0.005 0.93
0.23 0
0
1
13.99 13.51 9.39 19.21
0.15 0.12 0.0009 0.94
1351 1351 1351 1351

0.19
0.74
0.009
0.19
0.42
2.02
0.11
1351

Table 4. Descriptive Statistics for Variables Based on the Difference Deposit Insurance
Coverage
This table presents the descriptive statistics for variables based on difference in deposit insurance coverage. LATA is the ratio of liquid assets
(cash, placements in central bank, government bonds, and net interbank deposits) to total assets. LADEP is the ratio of liquid assets to deposits.
CTA is the ratio cash to total assets. LTA is the ratio of loans to total assets. DEPINS is the percentage of insured deposits to total deposits.
LISTED is a dummy variable, where the value is 1 for banks listed in stock exchange, and 0 otherwise. LnTA is the natural logarithm of total
assets. EQTA is the ratio of equity to total assets.
Variables
Ratio of Liquid
Assets to Total
Assets (LATA)
Ratio of
Liquid Assets
to Deposits
(LADEP)
Ratio of Cash
to Total Assets
(CTA)
Ratio of Loans
to Total Assets
(LTA)
Listed Banks
(LISTED)
Ln Total Assets
(LnTA)
Equity to Total
Assets (EQTA)
Number of
Observation

D1 (Blanket guarantee only for
domestic banks)
Mean
Md
Min
Max St.Dev Mean
0.42
0.42
0.05
0.99
0.2
0.38

Md
0.36

Min
0.08

Max
0.95

0.62

0.55

0.03

4.93

0.41

0.54

0.48

0.1

2.52

0.33

0.02

0.01

0.0001

0.14

0.02

0.02

0.01 0.00004

0.1

0.5

0.5

0.004

0.94

0.2

0.54

0.55

0.004

0.12

0

0

1

0.33

0.14

0

14.32

14.22

9.39

19.38

1.85

14.73

0.14

0.11

0.0004

0.62

0.09

0.13

1544

1544

1544

1544

1544

215
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D2 (Full Coverage)

D3 (5 Billion Rupiah)
Md
0.36

Min
0.08

Max
0.97

St.Dev
0.19

0.57

0.51

0.09

2.84

0.37

0.02

0.02

0.01

0.0001

0.08

0.02

0.93

0.19

0.52

0.54

0.006

0.95

0.19

0

1

0.35

0.15

0

0

1

0.36

14.62

9.92

19.35

1.8

14.79

14.7

9.91

19.32

1.86

0.11

0.003

0.59

0.09

0.14

0.11

0.003

0.59

0.1

215

215

215

216

216

216

216

216

215

St.Dev Mean
0.18
0.4
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Table 4. Descriptive Statistics for Variables Based on the Difference Deposit Insurance
Coverage (Continued)
Variables
Ratio of Liquid Assets to Total Assets (LATA)
Ratio of Liquid Assets to Deposits (LADEP)
Ratio of Cash to Total Assets (CTA)
Ratio of Loans to Total Assets (LTA)
Listed Banks (LISTED)
Ln Total Assets (LnTA)
Equity to Total Assets (EQTA)
Number of Observation

Mean
0.41
0.6
0.02
0.51
0.15
14.91
0.13
215

D4 (1 Billion Rupiah)
Md
Min
Max
0.38
0.09
0.97
0.55
0.12
5.35
0.01
0.0001
0.1
0.53
0.03
0.94
0
0
1
14.85
9.93
19.36
0.11
0.003
0.54
215
215
215

St.Dev
0.19
0.45
0.02
0.19
0.36
1.83
0.09
215

Mean
0.38
0.59
0.02
0.54
0.16
15.05
0.16
534

D5 (100 Million Rupiah)
Md
Min
Max St.Dev
0.35
0.06
0.97
0.19
0.48
0.03
8.95
0.56
0.01
0.0001
0.09
0.02
0.56
0.02
0.95
0.18
0
0
1
0.36
15.02
9.84
19.53
1.8
0.12
0.0001
0.94
0.13
534
534
534
534

Table 5. Correlation Matrix
This table is the correlation matrix. LATA is the ratio of liquid assets (cash, placements in central bank, government bonds, and net interbank
deposits) to total assets. LADEP is the ratio of liquid assets to deposits. CTA is the ratio of cash to total assets. LTA is the ratio of loans to total
assets. LISTED is a dummy variable, where the value is 1 for banks listed in stock exchange, and 0 otherwise. LnTA is the natural logarithm
of total assets. EQTA is the ratio of equity to total assets.
Variables
Ratio of Liquid Asset to Total Assets (LATA)
Ratio of Liquid Asset to Deposits (LADEP)
Ratio of Cash to Total Assets (CTA)
Ratio of Loans to Total Assets (LTA)
Listed Banks (LISTED)
Ln Total Assets (LnTA)
Equity to Total Assets (EQTA)

LATA
1
0.687
0.243
-0.885
0.001
0.047
0.053

LADEP

CTA

LTA

LISTED

LnTA

EQTA

1
-0.012
-0.625
-0.005
0.039
0.345

1
-0.186
-0.089
-0.079
-0.108

1
-0.089
-0.088
0.011

1
0.409
-0.188

1
-0.385

1

liquidity position, because the owners of higher-capitalized banks may avoid exposing their
banks to excess liquidity risk (Dinger, 2009).
To account for these arguments, we include
log of total assets (TA) and equity to total assets (EQTA) as control variables. We also take
into account publicly-listed and non publiclylisted banks, using a dummy variable to control
it (LISTED), the value of 1 is for banks listed
in Indonesia Stock Exchange, and 0 for otherwise. We suppose that non-listed banks in the
stock market will experience more difficulty to
access funding sources, affecting their liquidity
position.
We estimate our empirical model using OLS
regression technique. We could not employ
fixed effect panel data because our control variable (listed banks) are mostly time invariant.
However, for robustness checks, we exclude
the dummy variable of listed banks enabling
us to estimate the empirical model using individual fixed effect. Similarly, time effect could
not be taken into account due to our variables
of interest (deposit insurance coverage) are individual invariant.

Results and Discussions
Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix
Table 2 to 4 report the descriptive statistics
of the variables used in this study. Overall sample statistics are reported in Table 2 while the
descriptive statistics for the variables based on
type of ownership is reported in Table 3. Table
4 report the descriptive statistics of variables
based on the difference deposit insurance coverage. While Table 5 exhibits the correlation
matrix of variables.
There are some notable differences in interested variables such as LATA, LADEP, and
CTA. Nevertheless, whether they have significant impact will be verified by more robust empirical scheme.
Estimation Results
Table 6 reports the estimated regression
using OLS with various liquidity measures:
LATA, LADEP, CTA, and LADEP. We find that
as expected, the impact of deposit insurance
coverage is generally negative and significant to
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The Impact of Deposit Insurance Coverage on Bank Liquidity
Table 6. OLS regression of the impact of deposit insurance coverage on bank liquidity
This table presents the coefficients of OLS regression of the impact of the level of insured deposit on bank liquidity. The dependent variable is
LATA is the ratio of liquid assets (cash, placements in central bank, government bonds, and net interbank deposits) to total assets. LADEP is
the ratio of liquid assets to deposits. CTA is the ratio cash to total assets. LTA is the ratio of loans to total assets. LISTED is a dummy variable,
where the value is 1 for banks listed in stock exchange, and 0 otherwise. EQTA is the ratio of equity to total assets. LnTA is the natural logarithm
of total assets. The value in the parentheses is standard error. *, ** and *** indicate significance of difference at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels,
respectively.
LATA
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 5
Constant
0.19544*** 0.25432*** 0.25336*** 0.25343*** 0.23207***
(0.03822)
(0.03655)
(0.03657)
(0.03658)
(0.03678)
D1
0.0386***
(0.00775)
D2
-0.0307**
(0.01402)
D3
-0.01245
(0.014)
D4
0.00326
(0.01404)
D5
-0.04223***
(0.00967)
Listed
-0.01201
-0.01086
-0.01064
-0.01063
-0.01173
(0.01204)
(0.01208)
(0.01209)
(0.01209)
(0.01205)
0.18397*** 0.1593*** 0.16031*** 0.16017*** 0.18683***
EQTA
(0.04016)
(0.04002)
(0.04005)
(0.04006)
(0.04039)
LnTA
0.0114*** 0.00929*** 0.00925*** 0.00916*** 0.01097***
(0.0024)
(0.0023)
(0.00237)
(0.00237)
(0.00239)
Observations
2726
2726
2726
2726
2726
Adj-R2
0.02
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01

LADEP
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 5
-0.48858*** -0.35472*** -0.35665*** -0.35671*** -0.40321***
(0.07759)
(0.07428)
0.07432
(0.07435)
(0.07474)
0.08789***
(0.01573)
-0.06378**
(0.02849)
-0.03789
(0.02845)
0.00291
(0.02854)
-0.09101***
(0.01966)
-0.01592
-0.01327
-0.01279
-0.0128
-0.01505
(0.02444)
(0.02455)
(0.02457)
(0.02458)
(0.02449)
1.85459*** 1.79858*** 1.80082*** 1.80037*** 1.85844***
(0.08153)
(0.08135)
(0.08139)
(0.08142)
(0.08208)
0.05337*** 0.04847*** 0.04843*** 0.04822*** 0.05213***
(0.00488)
(0.00481)
(0.00482)
(0.00482)
(0.00487)
2726
2726
2726
2726
2726
0.16
0.15
0.15
0.15
0.16

Table 6. OLS regression of the impact of deposit insurance coverage on bank liquidity
(continued)
Model 1

Model 2

CTA
Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

Constant

0.04186*** 0.04619*** 0.04615*** 0.04601*** 0.04592***
(0.0043)
(0.0041)
(0.0041)
(0.0041)
(0.00414)
D1
0.00285***
(0.00087)
D2
-0.00181
(0.00157)
D3
-0.00313**
(0.00157)
D4
-0.00333**
0.00157
D5
-0.00047
(0.00109)
Listed
-0.00499*** -0.0049*** -0.00488*** -0.00491*** -0.00491***
(0.00135)
(0.00135)
(0.00135)
(0.00135)
(0.00135)
EQTA
-0.03463*** -0.03644*** -0.03636*** -0.03641*** -0.03613***
(0.00452)
(0.00449)
(0.00449)
(0.00449)
(0.00455)
LnTA
-0.00119*** -0.00135*** -0.00134*** -0.00133*** -0.00134***
(0.00027)
(0.00026)
(0.00026)
(0.00026)
(0.00027)
Observations
2726
2726
2726
2726
2726
Adj-R2
0.04
0.03
0.03
0.03
0.03

various proxies of liquidity measures. Using the
first proxy of liquidity (LATA), we reveal that
the deposit insurance categorical variables to
be negative and significant (at 5% level of sig-
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Model 1

Model 2

LTA
Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

0.69529*** 0.63763*** 0.63864*** 0.63873*** 0.65871***
(0.03755)
(0.0359)
(0.03593)
(0.03594)
(0.03615)
-0.03776***
(0.00761)
0.03179**
(0.01377)
0.00971
(0.01375)
0.00139
(0.01380)
0.0395***
(0.00951)
-0.0353*** -0.03643*** -0.03666*** -0.03665*** -0.03562***
(0.01183)
(0.01187)
(0.01188)
(0.01188)
(0.01184)
-0.0778** -0.05364
-0.05465
-0.05452
-0.07959**
(0.03946)
(0.03932)
(0.03935)
(0.03936)
(0.0397)
-0.00983*** -0.00774*** -0.00767*** -0.00764*** -0.00931***
(0.00236)
(0.00232)
(0.00233)
(0.00233)
(0.00235)
2726
2726
2726
2726
2726
0.02
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.02

nificance) for D2 and D5. Nevertheless dummy
variable D1 is positive and significant. Turning
to the second proxy (LADEP), we find a similar
pattern with LATA in which D2 and D5 are both
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Difference-in-Difference Estimation
I. State-owned Banks vs Non State-owned Banks
Table 7. Difference-in-difference estimation for the difference effect of deposit insurance
coverage on bank liquidity between state-owned banks and non-state-owned banks
This table reports the difference-in-difference estimation for the difference effect of deposit insurance coverage on bank liquidity between
state-owned banks and non-state-owned banks. Panel A is the difference in the period between D1 (no deposit insurance coverage) and D2
(full coverage). Panel B is the difference in the period between D2 (full coverage) and D3 (max. coverage is 5 billion Rupiah). Panel C is the
difference in the period between D3 (max. coverage is 5 billion Rupiah) and D4 (max. coverage is 1 billion Rupiah). Panel D is the difference
in the period between D4 (max. coverage is 1 billion Rupiah) and D5 (max. coverage is 100 million Rupiah). LATA is the ratio of liquid assets
(cash, placements in central bank, government bonds, and net interbank deposits) to total assets. LADEP is the ratio of liquid assets to deposits.
CTA is the ratio cash to total assets. LTA is the ratio of loans to total assets. The value in the parentheses is standard error.
Panel A: D1 - D2

LADEP
LATA
CTA
LTA

D1
0.727857
(0.377978)
0.523572
(0.13808)
0.052082
(0.029386)
0.425378
(0.135629)

SOB
D2
0.626102
(0.154965)
0.510019
(0.141683)
0.041604
(0.023167)
0.434593
(0.140318)

Change
-0.101755
(-0.223013)
-0.013553
(0.003603)
-0.010478
(-0.006219)
0.009215
(0.004689)

D1
0.574139
(0.408423)
0.382942
(0.212057)
0.010889
(0.009189)
0.530666
(0.213257)

Non SOB
D2
0.502881
(0.37036)
0.330561
(0.17411)
0.009978
(0.008481)
0.585001
(0.190476)

Change
-0.071258
(-0.038063)
-0.052381
(-0.037947)
-0.000911
(-0.000708)
0.054335
(-0.022781)

Difference-indifferences
-0.030497
(-0.18495)
0.038828
(0.04155)
-0.009567
(-0.005511)
-0.04512
(0.02747)

D2
0.626102
(0.154965)
0.510019
(0.141683)
0.041604
(0.023167)
0.434593
(0.140318)

SOB
D3
0.670018
(0.210673)
0.559536
(0.150135)
0.035113
(0.018982)
0.4006
(0.141787)

Change
0.043916
(0.055708)
0.049517
(0.008452)
-0.006491
(-0.004185)
-0.033993
(0.001469)

D2
0.502881
(0.37036)
0.330561
(0.17411)
0.009978
(0.008481)
0.585001
(0.190476)

Non SOB
D3
0.530778
(0.406135)
0.336327
(0.170473)
0.010491
(0.00886)
0.568167
(0.185315)

Change
0.027897
(0.035775)
0.005766
(-0.003637)
0.000513
(0.000379)
-0.016834
(-0.005161)

Difference-indifferences
0.016019
(0.019933)
0.043751
(0.012089)
-0.007004
(-0.004564)
-0.017159
(0.00663)

D3
0.670018
(0.210673)
0.559536
(0.150135)
0.035113
(0.018982)
0.4006
(0.141787)

SOB
D4
0.698995
(0.179132)
0.574989
(0.14505)
0.035235
(0.019772)
0.390807
(0.142604)

Change
0.028977
(-0.031541)
0.015453
(-0.005085)
0.000122
(0.00079)
-0.009793
(0.000817)

D3
0.530778
(0.406135)
0.336327
(0.170473)
0.010491
(0.00886)
0.568167
(0.185315)

Non SOB
D4
0.56891
(0.517454)
0.350595
(0.167014)
0.010128
(0.008544)
0.560634
(0.181526)

Change
0.038132
(0.111319)
0.014268
(-0.003459)
-0.000363
(-0.000316)
-0.007533
(-0.003789)

Difference-indifferences
-0.009155
(-0.14286)
0.001185
(-0.001626)
0.000485
(0.001106)
-0.00226
(0.004606)

D4
0.698995
(0.179132)
0.574989
(0.14505)
0.035235
(0.019772)
0.390807
(0.142604)

SOB
D5
0.613324
(0.184334)
0.500873
(0.150821)
0.039959
(0.020092)
0.464175
(0.152046)

Change
-0.085671
(0.005202)
-0.074116
(0.005771)
0.004724
(0.00032)
0.073368
(0.009442)

D4
0.56891
(0.517454)
0.350595
(0.167014)
0.010128
(0.008544)
0.560634
(0.181526)

Non SOB
D5
0.576703
(0.644856)
0.338314
(0.179326)
0.010595
(0.008837)
0.568355
(0.184268)

Change
0.007793
(0.127402)
-0.012281
(0.012312)
0.000467
(0.000293)
0.007721
(0.002742)

Difference-indifferences
-0.093464
(-0.1222)
-0.061835
(-0.006541)
0.004257
(2.7E-05)
0.065647
(0.0067)

Panel B: D2 - D3

LADEP
LATA
CTA
LTA
Panel C: D3 - D4

LADEP
LATA
CTA
LTA
Panel D: D4 – D5

LADEP
LATA
CTA
LTA

negative and significant. However, the categorical variable D1 is positive and significant.

We find a different pattern when we use
CTA and LTA. Employing CTA, we find that
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II. Foreign Banks vs Non Foreign Banks
Table 8. Difference-in-difference estimation for the difference effect of deposit insurance
coverage on bank liquidity between foreign banks and non-foreign banks
This table reports the difference-in-difference estimation for the difference effect of deposit insurance coverage on bank liquidity between
foreign banks and non-foreign banks. Panel A is the difference in the period between D1 (no deposit insurance coverage) and D2 (full coverage).
Panel B is the difference in the period between D2 (full coverage) and D3 (max. coverage is 5 billion Rupiah). Panel C is the difference in the
period between D3 (max. coverage is 5 billion Rupiah) and D4 (max. coverage is 1 billion Rupiah). Panel D is the difference in the period
between D4 (max. coverage is 1 billion Rupiah) and D5 (max. coverage is 100 million Rupiah). LATA is the ratio of liquid assets (cash,
placements in central bank, government bonds, and net interbank deposits) to total assets. LADEP is the ratio of liquid assets to deposits. CTA
is the ratio cash to total assets. LTA is the ratio of loans to total assets. The value in the parentheses is standard error.
Panel A: D1 - D2

LADEP
LATA
CTA
LTA

D1
0.778944
(0.470091)
0.42937
(0.215427)
0.003942
(0.003826)
0.515901
(0.234351)

FOB
D2
0.722372
(0.483044)
0.378734
(0.205915)
0.003322
(0.003207)
0.549502
(0.230941)

Change
-0.056572
(0.012953)
-0.050636
(-0.009512)
-0.00062
(-0.000619)
0.033601
(-0.00341)

D1
0.569171
(0.372487)
0.419406
(0.201083)
0.027548
(0.026321)
0.497548
(0.189496)

Non FOB
D2
0.481176
(0.241081)
0.38122
(0.177516)
0.023495
(0.020643)
0.541064
(0.176543)

Change
-0.087995
(-0.131406)
-0.038186
(-0.023567)
-0.004053
(-0.005678)
0.043516
(-0.012953)

Difference-indifferences
0.031423
(0.144359)
-0.01245
(0.014055)
0.003433
(0.005059)
-0.009915
(0.009543)

D2
0.722372
(0.483044)
0.378734
(0.205915)
0.003322
(0.003207)
0.549502
(0.230941)

FOB
D3
0.769306
(0.552657)
0.378852
(0.193423)
0.003331
(0.002897)
0.538902
(0.215173)

Change
0.046934
(0.069613)
0.000118
(-0.012492)
9E-06
(-0.00031)
-0.0106
(-0.015768)

D2
0.481176
(0.241081)
0.38122
(0.177516)
0.023495
(0.020643)
0.541064
(0.176543)

Non FOB
D3
0.510817
(0.266994)
0.404044
(0.192846)
0.021438
(0.016804)
0.51655
(0.181767)

Change
0.029641
(0.025913)
0.022824
(0.01533)
-0.002057
(-0.003839)
-0.024514
(0.005224)

Difference-indifferences
0.017293
(0.0437)
-0.022706
(-0.027822)
0.002066
(0.003529)
0.013914
(-0.020992)

Panel B: D2 – D3

LADEP
LATA
CTA
LTA
Panel C: D3 – D4

LADEP
LATA
CTA
LTA

D3
0.769306
(0.552657)
0.378852
(0.193423)
0.003331
(0.002897)
0.538902
(0.215173)

FOB
D4
0.816477
(0.778604)
0.38121
(0.188073)
0.003065
(0.002919)
0.534744
(0.212081)

Change
0.047171
(0.225947)
0.002358
(-0.00535)
-0.000266
(2.2E-05)
-0.004158
(-0.003092)

D3
0.510817
(0.266994)
0.404044
(0.192846)
0.021438
(0.016804)
0.51655
(0.181767)

Non FOB
D4
0.541194
(0.261879)
0.422915
(0.189914)
0.021398
(0.017154)
0.506724
(0.179563)

Change
0.030377
(-0.005115)
0.018871
(-0.002932)
-4E-05
(0.00035)
-0.009826
(-0.002204)

Difference-indifferences
0.016794
(0.231062)
-0.016513***
(-0.002418)
-0.000226
(-0.000328)
0.005668
(-0.000888)***

Panel C: D4 – D5

LADEP
LATA
CTA
LTA

D4
0.816477
(0.778604)
0.38121
(0.188073)
0.003065
(0.002919)
0.534744
(0.212081)

FOB
D5
0.720054
(0.618543)
0.362649
(0.194215)
0.003204
(0.00367)
0.549985
(0.203192)

Change
-0.096423
(-0.160061)
-0.018561
(0.006142)
0.000139
(0.000751)
0.015241
(-0.008889)

the dummy variables D3 and D4 are both negative and significant. Again the dummy variable
of D1 is positive and significant. Using the last
proxy (LTA), we document that the categorical
variables D1 and D2 are negative and signifi68
https://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/icmr/vol8/iss2/1
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D4
0.541194
(0.261879)
0.422915
(0.189914)
0.021398
(0.017154)
0.506724
(0.179563)

Non FOB
D5
0.550168
(0.53759)
0.391046
(0.185586)
0.023768
(0.01858)
0.536362
(0.176205)

Change
0.008974
(0.275711)
-0.031869
(-0.004328)
0.00237
(0.001426)
0.029638
(-0.003358)

Difference-indifferences
-0.105397
(-0.435772)
0.013308
(0.01047)
-0.002231***
(-0.000675)
-0.014397***
(-0.005531)

cant; however, D5 is positive and significant.
In table 7 and 8 we report the difference in
difference of insurance estimation results. Only
little evidence is found here. That is to say that
the study could not find robust (statistically
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meaningful) evidence on the difference effect
of deposit insurance scheme on liquidity according to the ownership structure of the banks.
Analysis and Discussion
The empirical results provide partial support
to our hypotheses outlined above. Primarily,
we could say that the deposit insurance scheme
negatively affects bank liquidity. Banks in Indonesia tend to hold lower liquidity (and increase
risky asset held) in the presence of formal deposit insurance. Second we could not find a robust statistically significantly difference on the
relationship between deposit insurance scheme
and liquidity holding between various ownerships: both in the case of SOB versus other
banks and in the case of foreign banks versus
other banks.
We have taken some notes to explain the empirical findings. Beginning with the relationship
between deposit insurance scheme and bank liquidity, though the findings could generally be
said to confirm the hypotheses nevertheless its
robustness is less than our expectation (based
on Adjusted R2).
Two arguments could be put forward in explaining this finding. First, banks in Indonesia
were generally still risk averse during 20022005 (half of the observation periods). Banks
annual loan growth were only around 10%15%, aligned with deposit growth (they were
around 25% during 2005-2008, outpacing deposit growth that is only 15%) hence liquidity
proxies were high and stable. Banks’ liquidity
is not particularly responsive to changing deposit insurance scheme in this situation.
Why are banks risk averse? There are two
reasons. One is the trauma of the 1998 Indonesia financial crisis that caused many banks to be
heavily recapitalized using taxpayer fund. The
attitude of regulators, managers and owners (including the government, as some were still government banks) were naturally very reluctant
to grant loans. Second, there was a high (risk
free) interest rate in the environment. In the almost all observation periods, recapitalization
bonds formed a substantial part of banks assets.
Many of these bonds had high fixed coupon due

to its risk premium component. Hence it was
only logical that banks were not incentivized to
lend. Why should a bank expand to risky lending when it can obtain a (relatively risk free)
high coupon rate on bonds? Most recap bonds
of these types were retired during 2008-2010,
leaving banks with variable coupon that was
adjusted to much lower interest environment.
Therefore, banks once again have to turn to traditional lending business to maintain an attractive rate of profit.
Second, though explicit deposit insurance
has been established, (and especially since 2005,
the scheme is run by separated and independent
entity: Indonesia Deposit Insurance Corporation – IDIC), there is still the widespread implicit belief that the government would come to
the rescue (i.e. will bail out) if a bank failed.
This belief was substantiated in 2008 by the
rescue of Bank Century. In our opinion, this has
noticeably reduced the sensitivity of depositors
to the changing upper limit of insured deposit
(from 5 Billion Rupiah in 2006 to 100 Million
Rupiah in 2007).
Though there has been a commercial bank
liquidated in 2009, we think that depositors
still believe in the implicit blanket guarantee.
That is, government will still come to the rescue if a major failure event occurred (a large
bank failure or several simultaneous failure of
medium banks). Perhaps if depositors observe
a large bank liquidation event they would be
much more sensitive to changes of the deposit’s
nominal limit that is still included in the deposit
insurance scheme. Since there has not been a
single case of major failure event to date, our
supposition is still left untested.
Difference in difference methods could not
reveal robust, statistically meaningful insight
of the role of ownership structure in deposit
insurance scheme and banks’ liquidity holding
relationship. We attribute this finding to two
reasons. First the establishment of deposit insurance scheme has rendered the difference of
bank ownership as irrelevant. Banks are becoming similar in the eyes of depositors. Nevertheless we think this condition prevails in normal
or slightly deteriorated economy condition such
as those that happened in 2006 and 2008. Batu-
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nanggar (2007) who studied the 1998 Indonesia crisis found evidence of flight to quality. He
documents that a substantial portion of deposits has moved to SOB from private banks and
some portion moved offshore.
Second, except for a few banks (e.g. Citibank, HSBC, and Standard Chartered), most
of foreign banks have unique business models. There are two types of models. The first
one is financing follow the trade in which foreign banks are present only to serve corporate
(mostly that comes from similar country) need.
The other type is investment banking, in which
banks obtain most of their revenues from underwriting and trading securities. In both kinds
of business model, deposits collected from domestic residents are not an important source of
funds. The liquidity holding of these foreign
banks is not dependent on domestic deposit
funding (that might be sensitive to the deposit
insurance scheme).

Conclusions and Policy
Recommendation
We close the report of this study by outlining several concluding notes and policy recommendations. First, as hypothesized, deposit

insurance limit does negatively affect the liquidity holdings of banks in Indonesia. Nevertheless, we should note that the finding is not
as robust as expected due to some of the reasons explained earlier. Second, it would seem
that implicit (blanket) guarantee is a belief still
held by depositors. This runs counter to the objective of deposit insurance scheme: mitigating
moral hazard. Third, regulators should exert
more effort to improve the credibility of the
deposit insurance scheme. A credible insurance
scheme could be verified by sensitivity (and
the significance) of banks’ liquidity holdings.
Fourth, ownership structure does not seem to
have robust (statistically) significant effect on
deposit insurance and banks liquidity holding.
Deposit insurance has rendered the ownership
of banks as irrelevant, though we should take
note that this condition might be correct for
normal situation and may still change under a
more uncertain economic environment. Fifth,
the irrelevance of ownership may be driven by
the fact that deposit insurance has a positive effect and should be maintained. It helps to promote a healthier competition.
The relatively small explanatory power of
the independent variables, however, could be
considered as the limitations of this study.
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